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CFO role and CFO compensation: 




Given concerns over CFO pay, especially incentives, and considering the tension between a CFO’s 
fiduciary responsibility and being a key member of the firm’s executive team, we examine the 
determinants and effects of CFO compensation amount, incentive intensity, and proximity to CEO 
compensation in a sample of European companies (FTE 500, 2005-2009). First, we focus on the CFO role 
as a determinant of CFO compensation. Like prior work, we proxy for CFO roles by using hand-collected 
public data on education and past professional experience, but we supplement these proxies with 
proprietary data to more directly capture the firm-specific nature of the CFO job in term of its similarity 
with that of the CEO. We thus argue how CFOs can have varied roles characterized by different levels of 
financial expertise and CEO-likeness, and document that it is this latter aspect that is associated with CFO 
compensation. Second, we study the effects of CFO compensation design on outcomes in the CFO’s 
realm related to financial reporting. We find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality, while a CFO’s pay long-term incentive intensity and a CFO’s incentive 
compensation proximity with the CEO are negatively associated with financial reporting quality. Overall, 
then, our results suggest that CFOs get rewarded for their CEO-likeness, and particularly for their being 
similar to the CEO in terms of tasks and decision making authority. But it is their financial expertise that 
is positively related to financial reporting quality. At the same time, using compensation that is more 
incentive intensive and more similar to that of the CEO appears to be potentially detrimental to the quality 
of financial reporting. These results are relevant for boards involved in selecting highly expert CFOs, and 
their compensation committees charged with defining subsequently effective incentive compensation 
plans for those CFOs. 
 
Keywords: Chief Financial Officer (CFO), CFO role, CFO incentive compensation, CFO compensation 




In many companies, CFOs are second in command to the CEO,1 where both commonly appear in 
public together to comment on company developments beyond the required periodic disclosures of 
financial performance (Hoitash et al. 2016). This is not surprising as nowadays companies often seek 
CFOs who are actively involved in major business decisions and not just in financial reporting and other 
CFO functional duties. Unlike other finance and accounting positions who are mainly in charge of the 
technical aspects of accounting and financial reporting, CFOs are increasingly becoming involved in 
shaping and executing corporate strategy (Datta and Datta 2014). They participate in decision making as 
                                                 
1 To avoid the repetitive and cumbersome use of “her/his” or “she/he” gender-neutral terms, we consider the CEO 
to be female and the CFO to be male throughout the text without judgment or prejudice. 
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members of the senior executive team, are involved in strategy and operations as business partners of the 
CEO, and also often sit on the board.2 At the same time, due to their specialized expertise and unique 
technical knowledge, CFOs have more influence than CEOs over the firm’s financial reports (e.g., Mian 
2001; Aier et al. 2005, Geiger and North 2006) and they are expected to be the gatekeepers or watchdogs 
of financial information accuracy. This is akin to characterizing the CFO role as a peculiar mix of 
fiduciary duties over financial reporting and managerial involvement in decision-making (Indjejikian and 
Matějka 2009). 
Given that firms inevitably must handle such CFO “role duality” judiciously, our study contributes to 
the literature by considering CFO role characteristics as well as the determinants and effects of CFO 
compensation. Specifically, we address two research questions. First, we investigate whether differences 
in CFO role characteristics are associated with differences in CFO compensation, including CFO 
compensation relative to that of their CEO. Second, in line with prior work (e.g., Graham et al. 2005; 
Mergenthaler et al. 2008), and echoing concerns of policy makers and regulators, we examine whether 
CFO compensation has an effect on the propensity of CFOs to monitor and fulfill their fiduciary 
obligations (Li 2014), which we proxy in terms of financial reporting quality. In this second part, we also 
include in our tests the effect of CFO role characteristics directly on financial reporting quality. 
Our operationalization of “CFO role” constitutes an extension of prior work. As in prior work, we 
proxy for CFO roles by using hand-collected public data on education and past professional experience 
and skills, but additionally, we supplement these proxies with proprietary data to more directly capture 
the firm-specific nature of the CFO job and responsibilities. These data were entrusted to us by one of the 
major global compensation consulting firms and allow us to consider different manifestations of firm-
specific CFO jobs and tasks through a “CEO-CFO distance” measure of the extent to which the CFO job 
                                                 
2 Recent studies from practice suggest that the role of the CFO has expanded well beyond the traditional focus on 
accounting and finance. CFOs have become more involved in strategy and operations, with an increased expectation 
from the CEO and the board that the CFO provides input and leadership in all dimensions of the business. The 
global financial crisis may even have heightened this expectation, as well as the CFO’s profile, where volatility and 
uncertainty has drawn CFOs into boardroom conversations about forecasts, profitability, risk management and a 
myriad of strategic decisions (e.g., IFAC, 2013; Agrawal et al., 2013). 
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is more or less similar to that of their CEO. In this way, we identify two key role dimensions through 
factor analysis which we label “financial expertise” and “CEO likeness”. 
Regarding the association between CFO role and compensation, we focus on compensation levels in 
line with prior work (e.g., Jiang et al. 2010). But since regulators are questioning whether CFOs should be 
rewarded similarly to other top executives, particularly their CEOs to recognize their different roles, we 
also analyze CFO compensation relative to that of their CEO, including in terms of incentive intensity. 
Prior work suggests that incentive intensity may most markedly drive behavior (Milgrom and Roberts 
1992; Milkovich and Newman 2002). It should not be surprising then that the common debate suggests 
that incentive intensity is no innocent bystander to CFOs’ propensity to allegedly engage in managing the 
financial information on which they are evaluated. Indeed, during testimony before the Senate Finance 
Committee, US IRS Commissioner Mark Everson suggested that CFOs who are in charge of “minding 
the cookie jars” should be paid by “fixed compensation for specified contract periods.” Similar calls have 
been made elsewhere, such as by the CONSOB in Italy (Art. 7 – Remunerazione degli amministratori, 
March 2010). 
Our dataset is European. Commentators and policymakers have expressed growing concerns over CFO 
compensation in the US but also in Europe, where, in line with the spirit of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), a 
swathe of reforms has imposed more stringent fiduciary responsibilities on CFOs over financial 
reporting.3 This, in turn, has spawned concerns about compensation schemes for CFOs that are, for 
example, tied to their firms’ financial performance. Moreover, studies of CFO compensation have hitherto 
                                                 
3 The increased weight on the CFO fiduciary role has been apparent in the tightening of corporate governance 
regulations in Europe, the US (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and elsewhere (Hoitash et al. 2012). For example, in Italy, 
the law (L.262/05) requires that firms identify the “dirigente preposto”—typically the CFO—to certify the accuracy 
and completeness of the financial reports. Similarly, in France, the “Code du Gouvernement d'Enterprise” (Chapter 
14) establishes that the “directeur financier”—again, the CFO—is responsible for the completeness of external 
communication through financial reports, including specific risks. The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate 
Governance stipulates that the Finance Director/Head of Accounting testifies to the Board that the proposed annual 
accounts have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice; that all the information 
included is in accordance with the actual situation of the company; and that nothing of material importance has been 
omitted. Similar provisions also appear to have been adopted outside Europe and the US (where certification by the 
CFO became a key part of SOX), such as in China, India, and Australia, where the CFO has to personally certify the 
financial reports, too. Regardless of variations across countries in the details of such provisions, these reforms tend 
to impose more consequential financial reporting responsibilities on CFOs (Wang 2005, 2010). 
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been done mainly in the US (e.g., Indjejikian and Matějka 2009; Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Feng et 
al. 2011; Ge et al. 2011) although Europe is undoubtedly an equally pertinent setting to study 
compensation, due, in part, to the general debate about “American-style” executive compensation 
packages, as well as owing to different governance systems (Ferrarini et al. 2009).4 
Our key findings suggest the following. First, controlling for a number of other possible determinants, 
we find that CEO-likeness is a significant predictor of differences in compensation across CFOs and 
relative to their CEOs. Specifically, we find that the more the CFO is CEO-like, the higher his 
compensation both in terms of total amount and in relative terms (proximity) to his CEO. In this respect, 
we support the findings of Datta and Datta (2014), but we also show that when the CFO role-type is more 
managerial-like and the CFO is regarded more as a “partner” of the CEO, he also earns compensation that 
is more similar to the CEO’s, which may raise concerns about the CFO’s independence and monitoring 
propensity (Li 2014). This is the focus of our second research question about the effects of CFO 
compensation on outcomes in the CFO’s realm related to financial reporting, also considering the effects 
on that of the CFO role itself. Specifically, we find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated 
with financial reporting quality, while CFO pay’s long-term incentive intensity and CFO pay’s incentive 
compensation proximity to the CEO are negatively associated with financial reporting quality. 
Overall, then, and in terms of CFO role characteristics, our results suggest that a CFO’s financial 
expertise is positively related to financial reporting quality. In term of CFO pay, our results suggest that 
CFOs get rewarded for their CEO-likeness, and particularly for their being similar to the CEO in terms of 
tasks and decision making authority. This in line with human capital theory (e.g., where generalist skills 
earn a premium). In line with agency theory, our findings also suggest, however, that firms may need to 
de-emphasize compensation for the CFO relative to the CEO to properly motivate the CFO to maintain a 
focus on his watchdog duties as, indeed, we find that using compensation that is more incentive intensive 
                                                 
4 To address this deficit, several studies have investigated the determinants and effects of compensation practices 
outside of the US. However, these contributions have focused mainly on CEO, not CFO, compensation issues 
(Muslu 2010), or are mainly descriptive (Conyon and Schwalbach 2000ab; Conyon and Murphy 2000; Ferrarini et 
al. 2009). 
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and more similar to that of the CEO is potentially detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. 
Section 2 synthesizes the relevant literature underlying our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
research method. Section 4 presents the results. The final section concludes, discusses, and cautions. 
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
Prior Work 
CFO Role. We first draw on studies focused on analyzing the CFO role. The common thrust of these 
studies is that they conceptualize and operationalize the CFO role based on his educational/professional 
background and competences. One strand views CFOs mainly as financial experts and examines the 
effects of CFO “quality”—that is, his qualities or qualifications. In this vein, Li et al. (2010) focus on the 
effects of CFO expertise (measured by professional qualifications) and experience on adverse SOX 404 
opinions. Based on the idea that the quality of the CFO’s performance should be a function of the quality 
of the CFO, the authors predict, and find, that firms with less-qualified CFOs—that is, CFOs whose 
financial accounting knowledge appears to be wanting (who have less expertise) and/or who have less 
experience—are more likely to receive adverse SOX 404 opinions. 
Along the same lines, Hoitash et al. (2016) distinguish between “accountant” and “non-accountant” 
CFOs. Based on the idea that accountant types are more risk averse, they examine the performance of 
accountant CFOs with respect to a broad set of firm outcomes (R&D and capital investments, external 
financing, cash management and cost control), and they do this separately for firms in high- and low-
growth industries. Similar to previous research (e.g., Bédard et al. 2014; Li et al. 2010), Hoitash et al. 
(2016) designate a CFO as an “accountant” if he is a CPA or has worked as an auditor or controller. They 
find that in high-growth industries, accountant CFOs are associated with lower levels of investment in 
R&D and capital expenditures and a lower likelihood of engaging in external financing, where such 
alleged conservative behavior appears to negatively affect firm value. In contrast, for low-growth 
industries where risk aversion appears to enhance value creation, they document a positive contribution of 
accountant CFOs. 
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Taking a broader view of CFO background to include generalist/managerial competences, Datta and 
Datta (2014) draw on human capital theory to suggest that CFO compensation must reflect their 
managerial skills. In this vein, education and professional background are considered a signal of an 
individual’s human capital. Specifically, Datta and Datta (2014) find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite 
MBA earn a total pay premium (1) relative to those without an elite MBA degree; (2) relative to 
“accounting” CFOs with a specialized accounting background; and (3) relative to those with a non-MBA 
master’s degree. Moreover, CFO qualifications drive the components of their pay packages as well, as 
“strategic” CFOs with an elite generalist training are awarded both higher salaries and higher levels of 
equity-based pay, and thus, higher total compensation. For all MBA CFOs in general (i.e., elite and non-
elite), there is only a salary premium over non-MBA CFOs. The authors conclude that firms with an 
“accounting” CFO recognize the limitations of specialized skills at the corporate apex (consistent with 
other work on so-called “upper echelon” roles, e.g., Beyer et al. 1997; Geletkanycz and Black 2001) and, 
hence, offer lower compensation. An additional explanation for these results, however, is that functional 
skills can be obtained from lower-level employees, and therefore, do not command a premium in the C-
suite (Datta and Datta 2014). 
These prior contributions rest on two assumptions. First, they conceptualize the two roles of CFOs 
(“accounting” or financial expert vs. “strategic” or managerial) as being opposites, or if not that, as 
somehow implicitly incompatible. If a CFO is a financial expert, he cannot be “strategic” and vice versa. 
Hence, they presume a rather simplistic “either/or” framework that to some extent fails to capture the very 
real complementarities of the CFO role in practice (Byrne and Pierce 2007; Chang et al. 2014). Second, 
the operationalization of the role has hitherto only been related to a CFO’s educational and professional 
background, i.e., to their individual characteristics. This is at best partial because a given position like that 
of a CFO is defined also by what role the organization expects the incumbent to play (The American 
heritage dictionary of the English language, 1976)—that is, as a function or position that has a set of 
parameters within which some set of tasks must be completed (e.g., Chang et al. 2014; Krantz and Maltz 
1997). Formal roles delegated to CFOs carry authority and power to work on certain tasks in certain 
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ways, affect the nature of their collaboration with other executives, mainly CEOs, and the scope of their 
organizational contributions. 
Therefore, our aim is to complement prior literature on CFO roles by conceiving the various aspects of 
CFO role duality as potentially complementary and by considering the different roles in context—that is, 
by complementing a CFO’s professional characteristics with the type of job assigned and the extent of 
decision authority bestowed. This is consistent with the call that, to understand the CFO role, an analysis 
of the different manifestations of firm-specific CFO jobs is pivotal (Bédard et al. 2014). 
CFO Compensation. The second key component of our study is to consider CFO compensation, both 
its determinants and effects. In terms of the determinants of CFO compensation, the closest prior studies 
are Hoitash et al. (2012) and Bédard et al. (2014). Hoitash et al. (2012) find that the negative association 
between internal control weaknesses and the change in CFO bonus is stronger in firms with better 
governance oversight and with higher costs of misreporting, suggesting that the fiduciary duties of CFOs 
are ostensibly emphasized more in such firms. Interestingly for our purposes, Hoitash et al. (2012) thus 
suggest CFO-specific compensation features related to a CFO’s fiduciary duties. Bédard et al. (2014) start 
from the idea that individuals in different executive roles bring different skills to the table. Their findings 
show that companies whose CFO has a seat on the board are associated with higher financial reporting 
quality (i.e., a lower likelihood of reporting a material weaknesses in internal controls or having a 
financial restatement, and better accruals quality). Yet, they also find that CFOs with a board seat tend to 
have higher excess compensation signaling possible agency concerns. 
In terms of the effects of CFO compensation design features, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find 
that, while CFO incentives do not have a detectable effect on corporate leverage decisions for example, 
they do have a significant effect on some aspects of corporate financial decision making, such as earnings 
management decisions. To add, studies that examine both CEO and CFO compensation in comparison 
(e.g., Jiang et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2011) indicate that CFOs are possibly even more influential in their 
firms’ information manipulation behaviors than their CEOs, thus driving home the importance of the 
design of their compensation plans to appropriately mitigate this. In line with this, Indjejikian and 
| 9 | 
Matějka (2009) find that in the post-SOX period, public (relative to private) companies appear to have 
reduced the relative importance of CFO bonuses based on firm financial performance, signifying that 
concerns over CFO fiduciary responsibilities indeed play a role. Balsam et al. (2012) observe that CFOs 
receive higher bonuses when their companies meet or beat earnings forecasts. Specifically, their evidence 
suggests that when a firm meets or just beats its earnings target, CFOs are incrementally rewarded if they 
manage earnings expectations and/or discretionary accruals to presumably help achieve this result. 
Hypotheses 
The above-reviewed studies, and human capital theory generally, suggest that compensation should 
reflect CFO skills, where generalist skills should or appear to command a pay premium (Datta and Datta 
2014). Thus, if the CFO job, or set of tasks, is similar to the CEO’s, then the CFO, as a C-suite executive, 
should be compensated similarly to the CEO, based on overall firm performance (Balsam et al. 2012). 
Incentive compensation commensurate to that of the CEO may be needed to motivate the CFO to perform 
well in his managerial role and work well with and serve “on” the senior management team by 
undertaking important executive decision-making tasks. Therefore, we expect that the CFO role will 
affect both (a) the level and (b) the proximity of CFO compensation to that of his CEO, as follows: 
H1a: As the CFO is more “CEO-like”, the higher will be his level of compensation. 
H1b: As the CFO is more “CEO-like”, the closer his compensation will be to that of his CEO. 
In particular, “CEO-like” CFOs, as we will explain further below, are CFOs with a managerial/generalist 
background and whose tasks are similar to those of their fellow CEOs. And as we will define in more 
detail below, we refer to the closeness of CFO and CEO compensation in terms of “compensation 
proximity”. 
That said, given the specificities of the CFO role, firms should calibrate CFO incentive compensation 
to ensure that the CFO also maintains an appropriate focus on his fiduciary tasks. As such, and as the 
above-reviewed studies suggest, the need to maintain proper financial reporting quality implies that CFO 
incentive compensation is both calibrated and differentiated from the CEO’s in order to alleviate a CFO’s 
incentives to manipulate the financial information on which they are both evaluated (Indjejikian and 
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Matějka 2009: 1065). Hence, from a governance perspective and consistent with agency theory, we 
expect that firms that deemphasize CFO incentives should be able to mitigate earnings management 
behaviors and to motivate, on balance, CFOs to maintain an uncompromised fiduciary responsibility over 
accurate financial reporting (Graham et al. 2005). 
This premise is in line with two insights from prior work. On the one hand, the CFO is an executive in 
a particular position in terms of unique knowledge and relative influence over financial reporting 
(Indjejikian and Matějka 2009; Maas and Matějka 2009; Jiang et al. 2010). Consistent with agency-type 
arguments, the CFO might thus exploit his differential knowledge of, and influence over, financial 
matters to his personal advantage, for example, by making decisions that are aimed at increasing pay 
(Graham et al. 2005). This self-interested behavior should be more prominent when incentive intensity is 
stronger; i.e., in cases where a higher proportion of pay can be impacted by manipulation.5 
On the other hand, Feng et al. (2011) suggest that CFOs may become involved in accounting 
manipulations under pressure from the CEO. Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that the more similar 
a CFO’s compensation is to that of his CEO, the more muted the incentives for the CFO will be to act as a 
guardian over financial reporting quality. The degree of proximity of the compensation incentives for the 
CEO and CFO is thus plausibly indicative of the likelihood that the CFO acts in alignment with the CEO 
(Graham and Harvey 2001) rather than as the guardian or “watchdog” of financial reporting quality. This 
reasoning is also in line with Li (2014) who uses the compensation gap between the CEO and the “No. 2” 
as a proxy for the relative monitoring capacity of the No. 2 or CFO. High CFO incentive intensity, 
possibly similar to that of the CEO, is likely to increase the alignment, if not the risk of collusion, 
between the CFO and CEO as they both stand to benefit from the outcomes of managed earnings. 
Both explanations—CFO self-interested behavior and pressure from or collusion with the CEO—
suggest de-emphasizing CFO incentive intensity and incentive compensation proximity relative to that of 
the CEO to preserve or enhance a focus on financial reporting quality. Thus, we predict that: 
                                                 
5 This idea was very powerfully expressed in the above-mentioned quote attributed to US IRS Commissioner 
Mark Everson during his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, suggesting that CFOs who are in charge 
of “minding the cookie jars” should be paid by “fixed compensation for specified contract periods.” 
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H2a: CFO compensation that is stronger in terms of both short-term and long-term incentive 
intensity will be associated with lower financial reporting quality. 
H2b: CFO incentive compensation that is closer to that of his CEO will be associated with lower 
financial reporting quality. 
3. Method 
Sample 
We focus on FT Europe 500 firms in a proprietary database from a global compensation consulting 
firm for the period 2005-2009. In addition, we obtained financial data from Compustat and hand-collected 
further data from various public sources, such as Who’s Who, annual reports, and the corporate 
governance sections of company websites. Our initial sample contains 659 observations with 
complete data on CFO/CEO compensation and trademark CFO/CEO job evaluation metrics. For 
the same reasons as in prior research, we eliminate financial services, yielding a final sample of 
450 CFO observations. Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample of 450 CFO observations across 
years (Panel A), countries (Panel B), and industries (Panel C). Our sample is reasonably evenly 
distributed across years, and is also proportionally representative of the distribution of firms across 
industries and countries in the FT Europe 500, as well as Compustat in respect of industries. 
[Table 1] 
Measures 
The core of our analyses is based on the variable definitions shown in Table 2. As discussed in Section 
2 above, our main focus is on CFO role as the primary explanatory variable of CFO compensation. 
Consistent with previous work (Datta and Datta 2014; Bédard et al. 2014) and using public sources, we 
hand-collected information about the educational (MBA or not) and professional (consulting or auditing) 
background of the CFOs in our sample together with whether he is a CPA. Drawing on these data, it is 
possible to distinguish CFOs with or without managerial competences/background (Datta and Datta 2014) 
and with or without accounting background (Bédard et al. 2014). 
[Table 2] 
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To expand the analysis of CFO-role in prior work that focuses on the incumbent’s expertise or 
experience, we also consider firm-level elements of the CFO’s job, responsibilities, authority, and so on 
(see below). Through our access to the proprietary data, we can complement public data with what we 
term the “CEO-CFO distance” measure, a more substantive and firm-specific role measure that is based 
on a job evaluation methodology used for decades by a global compensation consulting firm and applied 
to thousands of jobs over time. This job evaluation methodology adopts a systematic approach for ranking 
and comparing executive jobs by company, considering the requirements of the role instead of the 
individual characteristics of the job holder, recognizing and assessing both job content and context, 
essentially capturing eight different variables, seven of which related to management duties and one to 
practical know-how. The evaluation method focuses on decision-making scope, managerial involvement, 
communication abilities, capacity to exert influence, as well as degree of autonomy. The methodology 
assigns a job score using a 14-tier grading system (A to N). The higher the tier (A), the more 
“managerial” the job; the lower the tier (N), the more “specialized” the job, requiring specific (single, 
technical) know-how. The CEO has the highest job evaluation score in the organization, hence the notion 
of “distance” because it is possible to calculate the distance of an executive position from the CEO as the 
difference between the respective job evaluation scores. Following this approach, the CEO-CFO distance 
measure, in our sample ranging from 0 to 8, indicates the extent to which the CFO job designed by the 
company is “CEO-like” (our term). The lower the distance (0), the higher the CFO’s managerial scope, 
i.e., the more the CFO is akin to a “business partner” of the CEO. Conversely, the higher the distance (8), 
the higher the CFO’s professional scope; i.e., the more the CFO is akin to be (only a) financial expert.6 
We also create a dummy variable when the CFO is a member of the board. Prior work (e.g., Bédard et 
al. 2014) suggests that CFOs who are board members potentially exert greater influence and, therefore, 
possibly greater latitude in choices about their compensation plans as well as accounting methods. From 
                                                 
6 It is important to underline that this variable is not a proxy for the hierarchical distance between the CEO and the 
CFO, as indeed the measure captures multiple managerial dimensions of the job. In fact, given that the CFO reports 
directly to the CEO in nearly all firms implies that the hierarchical distance in terms of organizational levels would 
be invariantly equal to one. CEO-CFO distance as measured here, however, varies between 0 and 8. 
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an agency perspective, CFOs with board membership might exploit their more powerful position to their 
advantage. We include this variable in our analyses also for a reason that is more pertinently related to the 
tenor of our argument, notably, that CFOs sitting on the board are possibly more “managerial” and more 
similar to their CEOs, and thus, also more likely to have more similar compensation as well. In other 
words, both the CFO “power” and “managerial role” arguments, which are plausible but empirically hard 
to distinguish through this proxy, warrant inclusion of the board membership variable in our analysis. 
In total, we have six variables that describe the various elements of a CFO role: four related to CFO 
competences—i.e., an Education variable, a qualification (CPA) variable, and two background 
(Experience in Auditing and Consulting) variables—one related to CFO job-type (the CEO-CFO distance 
variable), and one related to CFO power (the Director variable). 
Regarding CFO compensation, we also have several variables. In line with previous work, we use the 
(log of) CFO compensation amount, which is the sum of salary, bonus, and long-term incentives, where 
the latter is provided by the consulting company—defined as the total value of long-term incentives 
estimated using the binomial method.7 In addition, we construct CFO compensation proximity with the 
CEO for each CFO-CEO pair by company as CFO total compensation divided by CEO total 
compensation. Regarding the incentives part of compensation, we define CFO short-term incentive 
intensity as CFO bonus divided by total cash compensation, and CFO long-term incentive intensity as the 
amount of his long-term incentives divided by total compensation. We also analyze CFO incentive 
compensation proximity with the CEO, calculated as CFO total incentive compensation divided by CEO 
total incentive compensation. 
Similar to prior studies in CEO and CFO compensation, we control for CFO individual-level 
variables—CFO tenure and CFO gender as well as newly-hired CFOs (with the dummy variable same 
job/same individual); for corporate governance monitoring environment—Board size, the presence of a 
financial expert on the audit committee, and the presence of the remuneration committee; as well as for 
                                                 
7 The binomial method (Cox, Ross and Rubinstein 1979) has been shown to give the same results for traded 
options as the Black-Scholes method. Long-term incentives include stock option plans, phantom option plans, 
performance share plans, restricted share plans, and long-term cash plans. 
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firm size (total assets), firm performance (ROA), and industry (regulated industry). To control for country 
effects, we use the country legal and institutional variables from La Porta et al. (1998) and Leuz et al. 
(2003) (legal origin, legal tradition, outside investor rights, legal enforcement, importance of equity 
market, ownership concentration, and disclosure index). In addition to previous literature, we use CEO 
total compensation (CEO compensation amount) as a control variable for the analyses on CFO 
compensation amount because CEO pay tends to be used to benchmark the compensation of other C-suite 
executives. Finally, we control for whether the CFO has been a CEO before (Former CEO) because CFO 
compensation proximity might depend not only on the similarity within the current CFO-CEO dyad, but 
also on the compensation over time related to the CFO’s own career (e.g., or especially, as a former 
CEO). Table 2 provides detailed variable definitions for all these variables. 
For the second part of our study that analyzes the effects of CFO role and CFO compensation on the 
quality of financial reporting, we draw on prior work (e.g., Jiang et al. 2010) that examines CFO-related 
outcome measures in terms of properties of earnings that are likely the result of CFO monitoring of the 
accounting system. Given that the CFO has the opportunity and ability to make accounting decisions that 
change reported income, we focus on discretionary accruals to proxy for our notion of reporting quality. 
The larger the value of discretionary accruals, the lower the quality of earnings and thus financial 
reporting (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995). Specifically, and as shown in Table 2, to capture accrual-based 
earnings management, we follow prior studies that use the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model (DAJ) and 
the performance-matched discretionary accruals model (DAK) in Kothari et al. (2005).8 In addition, we 
use the modified-Jones model (DAMJ), as described in Dechow et al. (1995), for our additional analyses. 
Similar to previous studies (Feng et al. 2011; Dechow et al. 2010; Jiang et al. 2010) our control variables 
for financial reporting quality include firm leverage and firm cash performance (Cash flow from 
operations over sales). In addition, we use the relevant control variables related to CFO characteristics, 
firm corporate governance, firm size, firm performance, and country discussed above. 
                                                 
8 Discretionary accruals are estimated by country, industry (Fama-French classification) and year, and by 
considering the whole population of companies in Compustat related to the countries included in our database. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on CFO compensation (in €000) for 2005-2009. The data show 
the amount of CFO total compensation, which is on average about €1.5m. In terms of proximity of CFO 
compensation to that of the CEO, CFO total compensation is, on average, 57% of CEO total 
compensation. CFO short-term [long-term] incentive intensity is 0.40 [0.24], meaning that CFO bonuses 
[long-term incentives] are 40% [24%] of [total] CFO cash compensation. Comparing means, and 
compared to CEOs (untabulated t-test), CFOs earn significantly lower compensation in both amount as 
well as expressed in terms of incentive intensity. Overall, this is descriptively in line with prior work (i.e., 
Jiang et al. 2010; Aggarwal and Samwick 2003). 
[Table 3] 
Table 3 also reports the descriptive statistics for the CFO role variables. The data show a mean 
(median) distance between the CEO and CFO of 3.63 (4) over a range from 0 to 8. Comparing means 
(untabulated t-test) of low-distance CFOs and high-distance ones, low-distance CFOs earn significantly 
higher compensation in both amount as well as in terms of incentive intensity. The data in Table 3 also 
indicate that 33% of the CFOs possess a CPA qualification whilst 26% have an auditing background, with 
17% having some consulting experience. 47% of the CFOs in our sample have an MBA or equivalent, 
and 41% sit on their company’s board. Firms in our sample exhibit discretionary accruals that, on 
average, represent circa -1.5% of total assets according to the Jones and modified-Jones model, and 
average performance-matched discretionary accruals of -0.4% over the sample period. 
Regarding the control variables and the individual-level variables, CFOs in our sample are mostly 
males (96%) and have an average tenure of 4.5 years. A small number of the CFOs in our sample (8%) 
were a CEO previously. 
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Turning to the corporate governance variables, the average board in our sample has about 12 members. 
28% of the sample companies have a financial expert on the Audit Committee.9 Nearly all companies 
(88%) have a Remuneration Committee. Average total assets of about €31bn suggest that the sample 
consists of reasonably large firms (sales exceed €50bn in the top decile). Mean returns (ROA) are 8% 
across firms and years. Returns are quite stable over time, ranging between 9.9% in 2006 and 6.4% in 
2009. Leverage, calculated as equity over total assets, and cash flow from operations over sales, are 35% 
and 5.26 respectively on average. 24% of the firms in our sample operate in regulated industries. 
Because we allow the various aspects of the CFO role to be potentially complementary (i.e., each CFO 
is expected to exhibit varying levels of financial expertise and CEO-likeness), we do not classify CFOs as 
either fiduciary or managerial in type. Instead, we employ factor analysis to combine the six variables 
related to these aspects of the CFO role. Table 4 shows how the different items that proxy for these 
various aspects of the CFO role relate to each other. Both models (with and without factor rotation) 
extract two factors with eigenvalues exceeding 1. We use this consistent factor-based grouping to create 
our empirical analogues of the Financial Expertise and CEO-likeness constructs.10 
[Table 4] 
Correlations 
Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients among the main variables of interest, which appear to be 
consistent with intuition and our expectations. CFO compensation amount is positively related with all the 
other compensation variables and also with both CEO-likeness and financial expertise, although less 
strongly with the latter. Compensation proximity, on the contrary, is positively and significantly 
correlated only with CEO-likeness. Several compensation variables related to proximity and incentive 
                                                 
9 There is quite some variation across countries in this respect: there are countries (e.g., Ireland, United Kingdom, 
Switzerland), where the financial expert is present in more than 50% of the cases, while there are other countries in 
which the presence is quite rare (e.g., Italy and Portugal, with around 9%). 
10 As is customary for factor analysis-based variable construction, we take the linear combination (sum) of the 
items loading on each factor. Specifically, the Financial Expertise variable is the sum of the values of the CPA and 
Experience in Auditing dummy variables minus the value of the Education dummy (because of the negative sign 
from the factor analysis) for each observation [ranging from -1 to +2 with a mean 0.12]. Similarly, the CEO-likeness 
variable is the sum of the values of the Experience in Consulting and Director dummy variables minus the value of a 
CEO-CFO distance dummy (equal to 1 for an above-median distance) [ranging from -1 to +2 with a mean of 0.02]. 
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intensity are positively correlated with different measures of discretionary accruals. The positive and 
significant correlation between CEO-likeness and financial expertise, although of inevitably low 
magnitude due to their factor construction, suggests that CFO roles come with both these dual aspects 




Regarding the determinants of CFO compensation, we use an OLS regression with country and year 
controls. Thus, to test the key association of interest between CFO role and compensation, we use Model 
[1] in the following general form (with firm and time subscripts suppressed): 
CFO compensation = α0 + α1 CFO role variables + Controls + εt [1] 
Recall from Section 2 that we have two dependent variables: CFO total compensation (level) and CFO 
compensation relative to his CEO (proximity). 
Regarding the implications of CFO compensation, we again use an OLS regression model, with 
country, year, and industry controls, in the following general form: 
Financial reporting quality = α0 + α1 CFO compensation variables + α2 CFO role 
variables + Controls + εt [2] 
The main dependent variable or proxy for financial reporting quality is based on discretionary accruals 
calculated two different ways using the Jones model and performance-matched discretionary accruals. In 
all regressions, we compute heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by firm level. 
Main Findings 
Table 6 reports the results for H1a (column 1), which maintains that CEO-likeness is associated with 
higher levels of compensation, and H1b (column 2) stating that CEO-likeness implies compensation that 
is more similar to that of the CEO. The results indicate support for both hypotheses. The effect of CEO-
likeness is significantly positive in the presence of all the control variables, thus supporting the prediction 
that firms design pay packages depending on CFO type. Specifically, CFOs with more managerial 
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background or focus in their jobs, and thus, who are more “like” CEOs, are both compensated more as 
well as more similarly to their CEOs. In terms of economic significance, CFOs that are one unit “more 
like” their CEO (as measured by our CEO-likeness variable) earn 8.4% more and move 5.8% closer to the 
compensation of their CEO (as measured by our CFO-CEO compensation proximity ratio). In terms of 
control variables, CFO compensation amount is also positively associated with tenure (and, 
correspondingly, with the same job/same individual variable); with the compensation amount of his CEO; 
with the presence of a remuneration committee; and with company size. CFO-CEO compensation 
proximity is positively associated with the CFO being male, the CFO having been a former CEO, and 
with tenure (same job/same individual). Regarding country variables (untabulated), the higher the outside 
investor rights, the lower the CFO compensation amount; and the higher the disclosure index, the lower 
the CFO compensation as well as the CFO compensation proximity with the CEO, suggesting greater 
mitigation of potential agency problems. 
[Table 6] 
 Table 7 shows the results regarding the implications of CFO compensation. Specifically, we examine 
H2a on the association between CFO short-term and long-term incentive intensity and financial reporting 
quality, and H2b on the link between CFO-CEO incentive compensation proximity and financial 
reporting quality. Results across the models using the two variations of our key dependent variable 
consistently indicate support for both hypotheses. The significant positive relationship between long-term 
incentive intensity of CFO compensation and discretionary accruals suggests that a higher weight of long-
term incentives in CFO compensation is associated with lower quality of financial reporting. 
Economically, a one percent increase in a CFO’s long-term incentive intensity results in a roughly two 
decile increase in the average value of discretionary accruals (0.044 in the Jones model and 0.052 in the 
Kothari et al. model). Similarly, higher CFO-CEO incentive compensation proximity, or thus closer 
similarity in the incentives of the CFO and CEO, is associated with lower financial reporting quality. 
Here, a one percent increase in CFO-CEO incentive compensation proximity results in about a one decile 
increase in the average value of discretionary accruals (or between 0.015 and 0.023). Financial expertise 
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is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that CFOs with stronger financial 
knowledge and background have a seemingly positive impact on the quality of financial reporting. This 
appears to be of lower economic magnitude, where a one unit increase in our measure of financial 
expertise (which is admittedly hard to interpret in economic terms) results in a decrease in discretionary 
accruals of a range in between 0.009 and 0.015. There is a negative and significant relationship between 
board size and discretionary accruals across all models, suggesting that companies with presumably 
stronger monitoring exhibit higher financial reporting quality. The findings also show a negative and 
significant association between CFO tenure and discretionary accruals and a positive and significant 
relationship with the same job/same individual variable, suggesting that financial reporting quality 
benefits from CFO experience but potentially suffers from entrenchment. 
[Table 7] 
Additional Analyses 
We conclude with some further sensitivity analyses. In order to understand which components of CFO 
role duality included in our factors affect CFO compensation design (H1a and H1b), we repeat the main 
analyses in Table 6 using the publicly-available variables included in our factor-based scores separately. 
Specifically, following Hoitash et al. (2016), we include CPA or experience in auditing they use to 
designate a CFO as an accountant when he is a CPA or has worked as an auditor. Based on Datta and 
Datta (2014), we include Education to indicate whether a CFO has an MBA. We also include Director 
(equal to 1 if the CFO sits on the board) in line with Bédard et al. (2104). In addition to our proprietary 
measure (CEO-CFO distance) and the above mentioned publicly-available measures, we also include the 
Tenure, Gender, and Former CEO variables. The results in Table 8 indicate that it is our proprietary 
measure—i.e., the type of tasks and the firm-specific function of the CFO—that influences both the 
amount of CFO compensation and its proximity to that of the CEO. The other results are essentially 
unaffected compared to those we report in Table 6. 
[Table 8] 
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In our analysis of H1 on the determinants of CFO compensation, we use country dummies instead of 
the La Porta et al. (1998) and Leuz et al. (2003) country legal and institutional variables (which we used 
in our main analysis primarily because they are more easily interpretable compared to nondescript country 
dummies). The results (untabulated) with reference to the main variables of interest remain unaffected.11 
In addition, we rerun our analysis of H1 including industry fixed effects (using 2-digit SIC codes). The 
key results of interest (untabulated) remain unchanged (the results for CEO-likeness are actually 
stronger). 
We also parse the CFO compensation components and find that the higher the CEO-likeness, the 
higher the base salary and the long-term incentives compensation components, which supports the human 
capital rationale. Regarding proximity, the higher the CEO-likeness, the higher the similarity of CFO 
compensation with the CEO’s in terms of base salary and bonus, the latter possibly reflecting a greater 
similarity in terms of the underlying objectives (performance targets). 
In our analyses of the effects of CFO role-types and CFO compensation (H2), we use the modified-
Jones model (DAMJ) as described in Dechow et al. (1995) to measure our dependent variable, i.e., 
financial reporting quality. Our main results (see Table 9) are confirmed. In addition, we include the 
volatility of revenues and the volatility of sales growth as additional control variables (as in Chava and 
Purnanandam 2010). We use country dummies instead of the Leuz et al. (2003) variables. Here, too, the 
results (untabulated) with reference to the main variables of interest remain unaffected. 
[Table 9] 
Given the importance of audit committees in influencing the quality of financial reporting (e.g., 
Carrera et al. 2017), we did additional analyses using the various audit committee variables available for 
our sample. We found that 97% of our sample firms have an audit committee; that 93% of the audit 
committees have an independent chair; and that there is a financial expert on 29% of the audit 
                                                 
11 Regarding the country-level variables, however, we also note that compensation proximity is significantly 
higher in common law countries. We also find positive and significant relations between compensation proximity 
and outside investor rights, the importance of equity markets, and ownership concentration, suggesting that in 
contexts where monitoring is stronger, there may be greater tolerance for a closer proximity of CFO pay to that of 
the CEO. 
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committees. When the chair of the audit committee is not independent, CFO financial expertise is 
significantly lower (-0.35, t = 1.43, p< 0.10, one-tailed). When there is a financial expert on the audit 
committee, both CEO-likeness (0.21, t = 2.30, p < 0.05) and CFO financial expertise (0.25, t = 2.15, p < 
0.05) are significantly higher. These univariate associations point a certain picture of corporate 
governance, where more independent and more expert audit committees are associated with 
commensurate financial expertise of the CFO but also a higher degree of CEO-likeness. 
Therefore, we rerun our analyses for H2a and H2b by including specific audit committee variables 
(audit committee or not; independent chair of the audit committee; financial expert on the audit 
committee) in our regressions. Interestingly, the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee is 
positively associated with the magnitude of accruals (using the Jones and Kothari models), suggesting 
lower reporting quality. This is, however, in line with the findings of Carrera et al. (2017). CFO financial 
expertise continues to be negatively associated with discretionary accruals, indicating a positive effect on 
financial reporting quality. Hence, the effect of the CFO role appears to be even more important in light 
of the positive association between discretionary accruals and a financial expert on the audit committee. 
One reason is, as was argued in prior work, that, in fact, a CFO with greater financial expertise is the one 
who may be able to effectively counterbalance the potential influence of financial experts on the audit 
committee who are likely to be considered ‘opinion leaders’ on accounting choices and financial reporting 
decisions (Chiu et al., 2013). 
Focusing on countries specifically, we also rerun our analyses on H1a and H1b by considering only 
the three major EU countries included in our sample (as in Muslu 2010)—i.e., France, Germany, UK. Our 
main results remain unchanged. Furthermore, for H2a and H2b, our main findings are also confirmed with 
reference to these countries. 
Finally, we also ran further models that mirror Table 6 but include various other plausible control 
variables to merely stretch our results in the sense of any of a number of possible omitted correlated 
variables that could explain both the CFO role and his compensation, and thus raise the always lurking 
and never satisfactorily addressable endogeneity concern which is endemic to the empirical approach 
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adopted in this type of studies (Nikolaev and van Lent 2005). We do this under the rubric of additional 
analyses because we feel that the cost to parsimony of including ever more control variables is not 
justified by the benefit of a slight, if any real, reduction in (one’s views of satisfactorily addressing) the 
concern about endogeneity. That said, one could argue that further proxies of, say, the complexity of the 
CFO’s job may be good candidates to additionally include in the model. Following Balsam et al. (2012), 
we thus considered the effect of a firm’s investing and financing activities on CFO compensation (i.e., on 
the right-hand side in Table 6), operationalized as the firm’s involvement in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) and the amount of debt and equity issuance. This did not affect the results of interest of our 
reported results. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Prior research has mainly focused on CEO pay despite the growing concerns over pay of the CFO, 
especially due to the fiduciary responsibilities that CFOs have in addition to managerial responsibilities 
on the executive team. In this study, we investigate determinants and effects of CFO compensation in a 
sample of European listed firms over the years 2005-2009. 
We use CFO role as the main determinant of CFO compensation. The operationalization of CFO role 
is one of the contributions of our paper. When attempting to define the CFO’s role, research has hitherto 
considered only CFO competences, such as CFO education or work experience (Datta and Datta 2014; 
Bédard et al. 2014), or indirect proxies of CFO managerial responsibilities, such as the financial 
performance measures used to evaluate CFOs for performing such duties (Hoitash et al. 2012), or whether 
the CFO works in a public or private company (Indjejikian and Matějka 2009). To expand the analysis of 
CFO role types in prior work, we consider two key elements of the organizational design of the CFO role; 
that is, CFO power (as measured by CFO membership of the board) and the different manifestations of 
firm-specific CFO jobs and tasks. This last variable is measured based on a proprietary distance measure 
of CFO vs. CEO managerial competencies and duties. Thus, our modeling of CFO role is based on CFO 
competences (as measured by four variables related to education, background, and two types of 
professional qualifications), CFO power, and the nature of the CFO job (expressed in term of distance to 
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that of the CEO). We employ factor analysis to combine these six variables, which results in two 
constructs that we label as being related to the financial expertise of the CFO and his closeness in terms of 
the nature of his job to the CEO (“CEO-likeness”). 
Importantly, our conceptual approach implies, and our empirical inferences suggest, that these two 
role dimensions can “co-exist” instead of being strictly “traded off” or being opposites. Indeed, it is 
commonly implied in prior work that if a CFO is a financial expert, he cannot be “strategic” and vice 
versa. In other words, prior work has typically, and certainly implicitly, assumed a rather simplistic 
“either/or” framework that to some extent fails to capture the very real complementarities of the CFO role 
in practice (Byrne and Pierce 2007; Chang et al. 2014). In this respect, our study adds to the prior 
literature on CFO roles by conceiving the various aspects of CFO role duality together and by considering 
the different roles in context—that is, by complementing a CFO’s professional characteristics with the 
type of job assigned and the extent of decision authority imparted. This is consistent with the call that, to 
understand the CFO role, an analysis of the different manifestations of firm-specific CFO jobs is pivotal 
(Bédard et al. 2014). 
We feel that our more encompassing operationalization of the CFO role is particularly pertinent for 
professional roles in the top management team, and especially for CFOs, where the demand for CFOs to 
have greater involvement in the business should not be detrimental to their quintessential professional 
fiduciary responsibility. This tension is what makes CFO roles unique, and such tension must be 
managed, not just traded off, as indeed firms would admit they cannot or will not. This is, after all, the 
very nature of the CFO job. 
With regard to the effects of the CFO’s role on compensation, we document that the level of CEO-
likeness is positively and significantly associated to CFO compensation amount and to CFO 
compensation proximity with the CEO. But when is close too close for comfort; that is, when may having 
a more CEO-like role and pay soften the CFO’s fiduciary role? This is an important agency/governance 
question (Graham and Harvey 2001; Mian 2001; Fee and Hadlock 2004): ensuring that the CFO 
stewardship aspect of the job is not compromised by the seemingly increasingly important quest for 
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business partnering. Consistent with human capital and labor market theories, CEO likeness gives CFOs 
an edge to command higher salary and earn more performance-dependent pay due to their inevitably 
valuable generalist skills pertinent for the C-suite whose occupants’ charge is to drive results. But the 
greater proximity of the incentives of CEO-like CFOs to that of their CEOs also likely implies that such 
CFOs may have objectives that are more closely aligned with those of their CEOs, which may 
compromise their fiduciary responsibility (e.g., Indjejikian and Matějka 2009; Hoitash et al. 2012). 
Our results indicate a positive relationship between long-term incentive intensity of CFO compensa-
tion and discretionary accruals, suggesting that a higher weight of long-term incentives in CFO compen-
sation is on its own associated with lower quality of financial reporting. Similarly, higher CFO-CEO 
incentive compensation proximity, or thus closer similarity in the incentives of the CFO and CEO, is also 
associated with lower financial reporting quality. Financial expertise, however, is negatively associated 
with discretionary accruals, suggesting that CFOs with stronger financial knowledge have a positive 
impact on the quality of financial reporting. When examining the economic significance of these three 
effects, our findings indicate that the negative effect of each of the incentive compensation variables is 
greater than the positive effect of financial expertise. On balance, then, the pull of either more incentive 
intense or more CEO-like compensation seems stronger than the pull from a CFO’s putative professional 
qualifications and considerations. The important issue therefore remains for firms to design CEO-like 
CFO roles with job design features, including compensation features, which yield the benefits of involved 
CFOs without undermining their fiduciary ethos. Firms should therefore consider whether CEO-likeness 
in terms of the CFO’s job can be achieved without also ever more closely matching the CFO’s compensa-
tion to that of their CEO. Our evidence, however, suggest that they may not. 
But our results also indicate a negative relationship between board size and discretionary accruals, 
suggesting that companies with presumably stronger monitoring exhibit better financial reporting quality. 
We also find a negative association between CFO tenure and discretionary accruals but a positive 
relationship with the length of time the CFO has been in the same job, suggesting that financial reporting 
quality benefits from CFO experience but potentially suffers from entrenchment. Clearly, there are many 
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other dials beyond CFO compensation that firms can turn to try and maintain a robust financial 
governance environment. That said, even in the presence of these other effects, the CFO incentive 
compensation variables retained their negative effect, which underlines their potency. 
We note, however, that we did not find a significant association between CFO short-term incentive 
intensity and our proxy for financial reporting quality. Instead, we find that the effect stems from CFO’s 
long-term incentives. In the broadest sense, our findings for this effect of long-term incentives is 
consistent with prior work arguing that equity incentives may motivate managers to engage in behaviors 
to inflate share prices (Bolton et al. 2006; Bebchuk and Fried 2010; Benmelech et al. 2010; Kim et al. 
2011). But again, our approach ventures beyond this by way of considering not merely incentive intensity 
on its own, but also the proximity of a CFO’s incentives to those of his CEO. Higher CFO-CEO incentive 
compensation proximity, or thus closer similarity in the incentives of the CFO and CEO, is also 
associated with lower financial reporting quality. 
Overall, then, our results suggest that CFOs get rewarded for their CEO-likeness, and particularly for 
their being similar to the CEO in terms of tasks and decision-making authority. But it is their financial 
expertise that is positively related to financial reporting quality. At the same time, using compensation 
that is too incentive intensive (on the long-term part), and too similar to that of the CEO, appears to be 
potentially harmful to the quality of financial reporting. These results are relevant for boards involved in 
selecting highly expert CFOs, and their compensation committees charged with designing subsequently 
effective incentive compensation plans for those CFOs. 
There are many avenues for future research on CFO compensation. CFO peer group compensation 
comes to mind (like similar work for CEOs—e.g., Bizjak et al., 2008). This would not only establish a 
“benchmark” for the CFO role and pay within the firm as in our study (using the job methodology 
through which we obtained our data), but also externally relative to “peer group” CFOs. It would also be 
worthwhile to try and incorporate more CEO characteristics into the analysis. For example, founder CEOs 
may exert more pressure on their CFOs than non-founder CEOs, along the lines of prior work by Feng et 
al. (2011) that suggests that CFOs may be drawn into accounting manipulations under pressure from their 
| 26 | 
CEOs. Moreover, social capital theory and social network analysis as in Carrera et al. (2017), for 
example, offer promise even beyond just the CFO-CEO dyad, deepening our understanding of “CFO 
embeddedness” within a specific social network, including (all) other top management team members and 
directors that may be levers or brakes on the CFO’s actions, information, and resources. 
Our paper obviously also has some limitations. Most of these are related to the strength of our proxies 
for the true underlying constructs of interest. We believe we do quite well with our CFO role proxy using 
individual-level and firm-level elements of what the CFO job entails. Regarding compensation, we can 
only observe realized pay, where, ideally we would like to be able to observe the actual incentive 
formulae. This would strengthen our proximity measures particularly, such as whether, say, the short-term 
incentive formula for the CFO and CEO contain similar or different performance measures, thresholds, 
and so on. That is the reason why we talk more cautiously about “compensation” rather than 
“compensation design” both in the title and in the text. Regarding our outcome variables, we are 
encouraged by the consistency of our results across the three operationalizations of accruals. But accruals 
are inarguably an imperfect proxy for the governance issues we are interested in and can only allude to at 
best. That is why we chose to talk about “implications” in our title: with inevitably better and/or more 
(corroborating) proxies for role, compensation, and consequences, we would feel more comfortable to say 
“implications for governance” for example. That said, to find that CFO roles come in various guises, and 
that these affect CFO compensation in systematic ways is rather intuitive, but to document this with a 
measure of CFO role that goes beyond the more typical proxies is possibly one contribution. However, 
our main contribution, we believe, rests with our finding that characteristics of both the CFO role and 
CFO compensation have implications for the influence that CFOs can have. Whether their influence is for 
better or worse appears to depend, among other things on a careful calibration of the CFO role and the 
accompanying CFO compensation. Our findings suggest that the financial expertise of a CFO is a positive 
aspect but also that, if not accompanied with proper incentives, such as when the CFO’s incentives track 
those of the CEO too closely, can be eroded. This, we believe, is an important take away for boards and 
regulators about, once again, the potency of compensation, in this case for CFOs particularly. At the 
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broadest level, our paper hopefully but carefully speaks to the perennial question for organizations of how 
to benefit from involved CFOs while preventing them from going native. 
References 
Aggarwal, R. K., and A. A. Samwick. 2003. Performance incentives within firms: The effect of 
managerial responsibility. Journal of Finance, 58(4), 1613-1650. 
Agrawal, A., J. Goldie, and B. Huyett. 2013. Today’s CFO: Which profile best suits your 
company. McKinsey Quarterly, 1, 1-6. 
Aier, J. K., J. Comprix, M. T. Gunlock, and D. Lee. 2005. The financial expertise of CFOs and 
accounting restatements. Accounting Horizons, 19(3), 123-36. 
Balsam, S., A. J. Irani, and Q. J. Yin. 2012 Impact of job complexity and performance on CFO 
compensation. Accounting Horizons, 26(3), 395-416. 
Bebchuk, L., and J. Fried. 2010. Paying for long-term performance. University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 158, 1915-1960. 
Bédard, J. C., R. Hoitash, and U. Hoitash. 2014. Chief financial officers as inside directors. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 31(3), 787-817. 
Benmelech, E., E. Kandel, and P. Veronesi. 2010. Stock-based compensation and CEO (dis)incentives. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125, 1769-1820. 
Beyer J. M., P. Chattopadhyay, E. George, W. H. Glick, D. T. Ogilvie, and D. Pugliese. 1997. The 
selective perception of managers revisited. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 716-737. 
Bizjak J. M., L. M. Lemmon, and L. Naveen. 2008. Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay 
and less efficient compensation? Journal of Financial Economics, 90(2), 152-168. 
Bolton, P., J. Scheinkman, and W. Xiong. 2006. Pay for short-term performance: Executive compensation 
in speculative markets. Review of Economic Studies, 73, 577-610. 
Byrne, S., and B. Pierce. 2007. Toward a more comprehensive understanding of the roles of management 
accountants. European Accounting Review, 16(3), 469-498. 
Carrera N., T. Sohail, and S. Carmona. 2017. Audit committees’ social capital and financial reporting 
quality, Accounting and Business Research, 47(6), 633-672. 
Chang, H., C. D. Ittner, and M. T. Paz. 2014. The multiple roles of the finance organization: 
Determinants, effectiveness, and the moderating influence of information system integration. Journal 
of Management Accounting Research, 26(2), 1-32. 
Chava, S., and A. Purnanandam. 2010. CEOs vs. CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 97, 263-278. 
Chiu, P. C., S. H. Teoh, and F. Tian, 2013. Board interlocks and earnings management contagion. 
Accounting Review, 88 (3), 915-944. 
| 28 | 
Conyon, M., and J. Schwalbach. 2000a. European differences in executive pay and corporate governance. 
Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 1, 97-114. 
Conyon, M., and J. Schwalbach. 2000b. Executive compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom 
and Germany. Long Range Planning, 33, 504-526. 
Conyon, M., and K. J. Murphy. 2000. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and 
United Kingdom. Economic Journal, 110(467), 640-671. 
Cox, J. C., S. A. Ross, and M. Rubinstein. 1979. Option pricing: A simplified approach. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 7(3), 229-263. 
Datta, S., and M. I. Datta. 2014. Upper-echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs. 
specialist skills. Strategic Management Journal, 35(12), 1853-1866. 
Davies, P. (Ed.). 1976. The American heritage dictionary of the English language. Dell Pub Co. 
Dechow, P. M., W. Ge, and C. Schrand. 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, 
their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2-3), 344-401. 
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting 
Review, 70(2), 193-225. 
Fee, C. E., and C. J. Hadlock. 2004. Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 37, 3-38. 
Feng, M., W. Ge, S. Luo, and T. Shevlin. 2011. Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting 
manipulations? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51, 21-36. 
Ferrarini, G., N. Moloney, and M. C. Ungureanu. 2009. Understanding directors’ pay in Europe: A 
comparative and empirical analysis. Law Working Paper No. 126/2009. 
Ge, W., D. Matsumoto, and J. L. Zhang. 2011. Do CFOs have style? An empirical investigation of the 
effect of individual CFOs on accounting practices. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(4), 1141-
1179. 
Geiger, M., and D. North. 2006. Does hiring a new CFO change things? An investigation of changes in 
discretionary accruals. The Accounting Review, 81(4), 781-809. 
Geletkanycz, M. A., and S. S. Black. 2001. Bound by the past? Experience-based effects on commitment 
to the strategic status quo. Journal of Management, 27, 3-21. 
Graham, J. R., and C. Harvey. 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the 
field. Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 187-243. 
Graham, J. R., C. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. 2005. The economic implications of corporate financial 
reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40, 3-73. 
Hoitash, R., U. Hoitash, and K. M. Johnstone. 2012. Internal Control Material Weaknesses and CFO 
Compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29 (3), 768-803. 
| 29 | 
Hoitash, R., U. Hoitash, and A. C. Kurt. 2016. Do accountants make better chief financial officers? 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 61(2), 414-432. 
IFAC. 2013. The role and expectations of a CFO. Published by the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC). 
Indjejikian, R., and M. Matějka. 2009. CFO fiduciary responsibilities and annual bonus incentives. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 47(4), 1061-1093. 
Jiang, J., K. Petroni, and I. Wang. 2010. CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings 
management? Journal of Financial Economics, 96, 513-526. 
Jones, J., 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 29(2), 193-228. 
Kim, J. B., Y. Li, and L. Zhang. 2011. CFOs vs. CEOs: Equity incentives and crashes. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 101(3), 713-730. 
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, 163-197. 
Krantz, J., and M. Maltz. 1997. A framework for consulting to organizational role. Consulting Psychology 
Journal: Practice and Research, 49(2), 137. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez‐de‐Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of 
Political Economy 106(6), 1113-1155. 
Leuz, C., D. Nanda, and P. Wysocki. 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: An 
international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 505-527. 
Li, C., S. Lili, and M. Ettredge. 2010. Financial executive qualifications, financial executive turnover, and 
adverse SOX 404 opinions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(1), 93-110. 
Li, Z. 2014. Mutual monitoring and corporate governance. Journal of Banking and Finance, 45, 255-269. 
Maas, V. S., and M. Matějka. 2009. Balancing the dual responsibilities of business unit controllers: Field 
and survey evidence. The Accounting Review, 84(4), 1233-1253. 
Mergenthaler, R., S. Rajgopal, and S. Srinivasan. 2008. CEO and CFO career consequences to missing 
quarterly earnings benchmarks, Working Paper, University of Iowa, University of Washington, and 
Harvard University. 
Mian, S. 2001. On the choice and replacement of the Chief Financial Officer. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 60(1), 143-175. 
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Milkovich, G. T., and J. Newman. 2002. Compensation (7e). Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
Muslu, V. 2010 Executive directors, pay disclosures and incentive compensation in large European 
companies. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 25, 569-605. 
| 30 | 
Nikolaev, V., and L. van Lent. 2005. The endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-debt capital 
and corporate disclosure policy. European Accounting Review, 14(4), 677-724. 
Wang, X. 2005. The impact of the corporate governance reform initiatives on Chief Financial Officer 
compensation. Working Paper, Emory University. 
Wang, X. 2010. Increased disclosure requirements and corporate governance decisions: Evidence from 
Chief Financial Officers in the pre and post Sarbanes-Oxley periods. Journal of Accounting Research, 
48(4), 885-920. 
  
| 31 | 
Table 1 – Sample Distribution 
Panel A: Distribution by Year 
Year Observations Sample proportions
2005 107 23.78 %
2006 73 16.22 %
2007 78 17.33 % 
2008 95 21.11 %
2009 97 21.56 %
Total 450 100 %
Panel B: Distribution by Country 
Country  Observations Sample proportions FTE 500 Proportions
Austria 5 1.11 % 2.0 %
Belgium 18 4.00 % 2.9 %
Finland 27 6.00 % 2.6 %
France 42 9.33 % 16.7 %
Germany 78 17.33 % 10.7 %
Greece  8 1.78 % 1.5 %
Ireland 10 2.22 % 1.1 %
Italy 22 4.89 % 5.5 %
Luxembourg  1 0.22 % 0.0 %
Netherlands 43 9.56 % 4.4 %
Norway 21 4.67 % 2.0 %
Poland 2 0.44 % 2.0 %
Portugal  3 0.67 % 1.8 %
Russia 5 1.11 % 7.0 %
Spain 10 2.22 % 5.5 %
Sweden  11 2.44 % 6.4 %
Switzerland 19 4.22 % 7.2 %
United Kingdom 125 27.78 % 20.8 %
Total 450 100 % 100 %
Panel C: Distribution by Two-Digit SIC Industry 







10-19 Mining and Construction 27 6 % 9.95 % 14 %
20-39 Manufacturing 235 52.22 % 43.40 % 27 %
40-48 Transportation 65 14.44 % 7.14 % 7 %
49 Utilities 41 9.11 % 3.87 % 19 %
50-59 Wholesale and Retail 44 9.78 % 8.77 % 15 %
70-89 Services 28 6.22 % 24.77 % 16 %
99 Non classifiable  10 2.22 % 0.83 % 2 %
10-99 Total 450 100 % 100 % 100 %
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Table 2 – Variable Definitions 
Compensation variables
CFO compensation amount Sum of salary, bonus, and long-term incentives (log) 
CFO compensation proximity with 
CEO 
CFO total compensation divided by CEO total compensation 
CFO incentive compensation 
proximity with CEO 
CFO total incentive compensation divided by CEO total incentive 
compensation 
CFO short-term incentive intensity Bonus divided by total cash compensation 
CFO long-term incentive intensity Long-term incentives divided by total compensation 
CFO-roles variables 
CEO-CFO distance Ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 8 (see text, Section 3) 
CPA Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO is a Chartered Public Accountant, 0 
otherwise 
Experience in Auditing Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO has some experience in an audit 
company during his/her career, 0 otherwise 
Education Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO has an MBA, 0 otherwise 
Experience in Consulting  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO has some experience in a consulting 
company during his/her career, 0 otherwise 
Director Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO sits on the Board, 0 otherwise 
Financial reporting quality 
DAJ We estimate discretionary accruals (DAJ) based on the Jones model (1991) as 
follows:  
(TAit /Ait-1) =  β0 + β1 (1/Ait-1) + β2 (ΔREVit  /Ait-1) +  β3 (PPEit /Ait-1) + eit   (1) 
Where:  
TAit = Total accruals 
Ait-1= Lagged total assets 
ΔREVit = Change in current revenues 
PPEit = Net property, plant and equipment 
 
We estimate the normal accruals (NAit) using the coefficients calculated in 
Equation (1): 
NAit =  (1/Ait-1) + 	  ((ΔREVit – ΔRECit )/Ait-1 ) + 	  (PPEit /Ait-1 ) (2) 
 
Where: 
NAit = Normal accruals 
ΔRECit = the change in accounts receivables from the prior year 
 
The measure of discretionary accruals (DAJ) is the difference between total 
accruals and normal accruals as follows: 
DAJ = (TAit /Ait-1) – NAit 
DAMJ We estimate discretionary accruals (DAMJ) based on the modified-Jones 
model in Dechow et al. (1995) which follows the estimation procedure of the 
Jones model reported above and simply modifies equation (1) in the following 
way:  
(TAit /Ait-1) =  β0 + β1 (1/Ait-1) + β2 (ΔREVit  - ΔARit /Ait-1) +  β3 (PPEit /Ait-1) + 
eit   (1) 
Where:  
TAit = Total accruals 
Ait-1= Lagged total assets 
ΔREVit = Change in current revenues 
ΔARit = Change in accounts receivable 
PPEit = Net property, plant and equipment 
| 33 | 
 
DAK We estimate discretionary accruals (DAK) following Kothari et al. (2005) as 
follows: 
(TAit /Ait-1) =  β0 + β1 (1/Ait-1) + β2 (ΔREVit  /Ait-1) +  β3 (PPEit /Ait-1) + β4 (ROAit 
/Ait-1) + eit   (1) 
Where:  
TAit = Total accruals 
Ait-1= Lagged total assets 
ΔREVit = Change in current revenues 
PPEit = Net property, plant and equipment 
ROAit = Return on total assets 
 
We estimate the normal accruals (NAit) using the coefficients calculated in 
Equation (1): 
NAit =  (1/Ait-1) + 	  ((ΔREVit – ΔRECit )/Ait-1 ) + 	  (PPEit /Ait-1 )+ 
+ 	  (ROAit /Ait-1) (2) 
 
Where: 
NAit = Normal accruals 
ΔRECit = the change in accounts receivables from the prior year 
 
The measure of discretionary accruals (DAK) is the difference between total 
accruals and normal accruals as follows: 
DAK = (TAit /Ait-1) – NAit 
Control variables  
Tenure Number of years the CFO has been in that company as a CFO 
Gender Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO is male, 0 otherwise 
Former CEO Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO was a CEO in his previous jobs, 0 
otherwise 
Same job/same individual Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO is the same person in year t as in year 
(t-1), 0 otherwise 
Board size Number of directors 
Financial expert on Audit Committee Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is a financial expert (a CPA, a CFA, an 
auditor, directors with a CPA or CFA designation, or experience serving as a 
CFO, controller, treasurer, vice president of finance, or experience working 
for a financial services firm or auditing firm) on the Audit Committee 
Presence of the Remuneration 
Committee 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is a Remuneration Committee, 0 
otherwise 
Total assets Total assets (log) in the same fiscal year 
Return on assets  Return on assets of the firm in the same fiscal year 
Leverage  Equity on total assets in the same fiscal year 
Cash flow from operations  EBITDA divided by sales in the same fiscal year 
Regulated industry Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm operates in a regulated industry (two-
digit SIC code 40-49) 
CEO compensation amount Sum of salary, bonus, and long-term incentives (log) 
Legal origin 
Categorical variable based on La Porta et al. (1998) and Leuz et al. (2003) 
ranging from 1 to 4 (English = 1, German = 2, Scandinavian = 3, French = 4) 
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Legal tradition 
Dummy variable based on La Porta et al. (1998) and Leuz et al. (2003) equal 
to 1 for common law countries and 0 otherwise 
Outside investor rights 
Anti-director rights index created by La Porta et al. (1998). It is an aggregate 
measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges from 0 to 5 
Legal enforcement 
The mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998) as in 
Leuz et al. (2003) 
Importance of equity market 
The mean rank across three variables used in La Porta et al. (1997) as in Leuz 
et al. (2003) 
Ownership concentration 
The median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms (La Porta 
et al., 1998; Leuz et al., 2003).  
Disclosure index 
Inclusion or omission of 90 items in the annual reports based on La Porta et 
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Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Compensation variables N Mean Median Std. dev. 25% 75%
CFO compensation amount 450 1,507.61 1,246.00 1,187.45 605.00 2,040.00
CFO compensation proximity with CEO 450 0.57 0.54 0.46 0.40 0.67
CFO incentive compensation proximity with CEO 450 0.62 0.50 0.96 0.33 0.66
CFO short-term incentive intensity 450 0.40 0.39 0.20 0.25 0.54




CEO-CFO distance 450 3.63 4 1.38 3 4
CPA 412 0.33 0 0.47 0 1
Experience in Auditing 432 0.26 0 0.44 0 1
Education 410 0.47 0 0.50 0 1
Experience in Consulting  414 0.17 0 0.38 0 0
Director 432 0.41 0 0.49 0 1
Financial reporting quality 
  
DAJ 315 -0.015 -0.014 0.070 -0.045 0.018
DAMJ 315 -0.016 -0.015 0.071 -0.046 0.018
DAK 260 -0.004 -0.002 0.070 -0.036 0.032
       
Control variables       
CFO tenure (years) 432 4.57 4 4.10 2 6
CFO gender (1 = male) 433 0.96 1 0.19 1 1
CFO as former CEO 428 0.08 0 0.28 0 0
Same job/same individual 450 0.91 1 0.25 1 1
Board size 430 12.40 11.00 4.47 9.00 15.00
Financial expert on Audit Committee 450 0.29 0 0.45 0 1
Presence of the Remuneration Committee 427 0.88 1 0.32 1 1
Total assets  447 31,265.28 13,944 48,166.92 5,202.86 30,527
Return on assets  447 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.11
Leverage  447 0.35 0.35 0.16 0.23 0.46
Cash flow from operations on sales 450 5.26 0.14 102.46 0.03 0.35
Regulated industry 450 0.24 0 0.42 0 0
CEO compensation amount 450 3,080.64 2,397 2,987.12 1,185 3,826
Legal origin 450 2.51 2 1.24 1 4
Legal tradition 450 0.30 0 0.46 0 1
Outside investor rights 450 2.93 3 1.62 1 5
Legal enforcement 450 9.13 9.2 0.81 9.1 10
Importance of equity market 450 15.84 16.7 8.12 7.2 25
Ownership concentration 450 0.34 0.31 0.16 0.15 0. 5
Disclosure index 450 69.58 69 7.73 62 78
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Factor pattern with  
varimax rotation 












CPA 0.844 -0.060 0.794 0.292
Experience in auditing 0.683 -0.295 0.744 0.012
Education - 0.554 0.171 -0.575 -0.073
Director 0.551 0.484 0.303 0.668
Experience in consulting  -0.124 0.707 -0.404 0.593
CEO-CFO distance -0.372 -0.451 -0.154 -0.564
Eigenvalue 1.943 1.057 1.793 1.207
 
This table provides the results of a factor analysis (principal component) of the six items potentially related to 
different CFO role-types. We present both the raw factor patterns as well as the patterns generated after a 
varimax rotation. The two factors are consistently retained with an eigenvalue above 1.0. 
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CFO-CEO compensation proximity 0.202 
 0.000 
CFO-CEO incentive compensation proximity 0.127 0.765 
 0.007 0.000 
Short-term incentive intensity 0.723 0.167 0.109 
 0.000 0.000 0.021 
Long-term incentive intensity 0.548 0.053 0.053 0.115 
 0.000 0.260 0.258 0.015 
Financial expertise 0.087 0.070 0.062 -0.009 0.068 
 0.078 0.156 0.213 0.861 0.173 
CEO-likeness 0.142 0.164 0.078 0.034 0.071 0.232 
 0.004 0.001 0.111 0.488 0.151 0.000 
DAJ -0.02 0.076 0.105 -0.049 0.076 -0.083 0.022 
 0.724 0.178 0.063 0.388 0.179 0.163 0.713 
DAMJ -0.024 0.080 0.113 -0.054 0.074 -0.08 0.030 0.996 
 0.670 0.155 0.045 0.337 0.188 0.177 0.607 0.000 
DAK 0.030 0.140 0.153 -0.063 0.144 -0.071 0.079 0.903 0.905 
 0.632 0.024 0.013 0.310 0.020 0.269 0.217 0.000 0.000 
Variable definitions in Tables 2 and 4. Significance of coefficients in italics. 
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CEO-likeness 0.084 ** 0.058 *** 
0.035 0.017 
Financial expertise 0.033 0.016 
0.027 0.013 
Tenure  0.017 *** 0.001 
0.006 0.003 
Gender  0.130 0.110 ** 
0.160 0.052 
Former CEO 0.097 * 
0.051 
Same job/same individual 0.169 * 0.111 *** 
0.099 0.041 
CEO compensation amount 0.579 ***
0.045
Board size 0.010 0.005 
0.009 0.005 
Financial expert in the Audit Committee 0.034 -0.008 
0.045 0.025 
Presence of Remuneration Committee 0.158 ** 0.062 
0.077 0.047 
Total assets (log) 0.063 *** -0.013 
0.021 0.011 
ROA 0.647 * -0.050 
0.338 0.179 
Regulated industry  -0.036 0.030 
0.052 0.030 
Constant 4.690 *** 0.281 
1.280 0.526 
Country controls Yes Yes 
Year controls Yes Yes 
N 386 386 
Prob F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.801 0.199 
Variable definitions in Tables 2 and 4. Clustered robust standard errors in italics; *** p < 0.01; 
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. 
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Short-term incentive intensity -0.022 -0.038 
0.025 0.023 
Long-term incentive intensity 0.044 * 0.052 * 
0.023 0.027 
CFO-CEO incentive comp. proximity 0.015 * 0.023 ** 
0.008 0.010
Financial expertise -0.009 ** -0.011 ** -0.017 *** -0.015 ***
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
CEO-likeness -0.005 -0.006 0.001 0.003
0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
Tenure  -0.002 * -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Gender  0.004 -0.004 0.010 -0.009
0.013 0.014 0.018 0.021
Same job/same individual 0.047 * 0.043 * 0.058 ** 0.054 * 
0.024 0.024 0.029 0.031
Board size -0.003 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** 
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Financial expert on Audit Committee 0.009 0.010 0.021 ** 0.020 ** 
0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
Total assets (log) 0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.000
0.005 0.004 0.007 0.006
ROA -0.044 -0.052
0.115 0.114
Leverage  0.064 0.074 * 0.012 0.020
0.041 0.040 0.031 0.028
Cash flow from operations/Sales -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
Constant -0.066 0.086 0.117 0.226
0.182 0.151 0.241 0.209
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 277 277 234 234
Prob F 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.165 0.173 0.165 0.187
 Variable definitions in Tables 2 and 4. Clustered robust standard errors in italics; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; 
* p < 0.10. 
  
| 40 | 
 








Education -0.075 -0.015 
0.047 0.029 
CPA or experience in auditing 0.036 0.039 
0.048 0.031 
CEO-CFO distance  -0.080 *** -0.037 *** 
0.021 0.011 
Director 0.005 0.026 
0.076 0.038 
Tenure  0.018 *** 0.002 
0.006 0.003 
Gender 0.120 0.108 ** 
0.146 0.052 
Former CEO 0.086 
0.056 
Same job/same individual 0.178 * 0.115 *** 
0.098 0.041 
CEO compensation amount 0.590 ***
0.045
Board size 0.012 0.005 
0.009 0.005 
Financial expert in Audit Committee 0.005 -0.021 
0.435 0.024 
Presence of Remuneration Committee 0.174 ** 0.061 
0.072 0.042 
Total assets (log) 0.071 *** -0.008 
0.020 0.011 
ROA 0.608 * -0.059 
0.332 0.177 
Regulated industry  -0.066 0.018 
0.047 0.029 
Constant 4.385 *** 0.263 
1.262 0.553 
Country controls Yes Yes 
Year controls Yes Yes 
N 387 386 
Prob F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.813 0.210 
Variable definitions in Table 2. Clustered robust standard errors in italics; *** p < 0.01; 
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. 
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Table 9 – Implications on financial reporting quality 
  
Discretionary accruals 
(modified Jones model) 
Short-term incentive intensity -0.023
0.025
Long-term incentive intensity 0.042 * 
0.024
CFO-CEO incentive comp. proximity 0.017 * 
0.009 
Financial expertise -0.010 ** -0.012 ** 
0.005 0.005 
CEO-likeness -0.005 -0.006 
0.005 0.006 
Tenure  -0.002 ** -0.002 * 
0.001 0.002 
Gender  -0.002 -0.011 
0.016 0.017 
Same job/same individual 0.048 ** 0.043 * 
0.024 0.024 
Board size -0.003 ** -0.004 ** 
0.002 0.002 
Financial expert on Audit Committee 0.009 0.009 
0.008 0.008 
Total assets (log) 0.003 0.003 
0.005 0.004 
ROA -0.035 -0.046 
0.115 0.113 
Leverage  0.061 0.071 * 
0.040 0.039 
Cash flow from operations/Sales -0.002 -0.002 
0.003 0.003 
Constant -0.028 0.127 
0.192 0.157 
Country controls Yes Yes 
Year controls Yes Yes 
Industry controls Yes Yes 
N 277 277 
Prob F 0.000 0.005 
R-squared 0.168 0.182 
Variable definitions in Tables 2 and 4. Clustered robust standard errors in italics; 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. 
